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Demonic despair under the guise of the good?
Kierkegaard and Anscombe vs. Velleman
Roe Fremstedal
Department of Philosophy, University of Tromsø – The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø,
Norway
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to clarify Kierkegaard’s concept of demonic despair (and
demonic evil) and to show its relevance for discussions of the guise of the good
thesis (i.e. that in f-ing intentionally, we take f-ing to be good). Contemporary
discussions of diabolic evil often emphasise the phenomena of despair and
acedia as apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good. I contend that
Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair is relevant to these discussions, because it
reconciles demonic (extreme) despair and acedia with the guise of the good.
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard provides an influential, systematic
account of despair that relates evil, despair, and acedia to each other.
Michelle Kosch argues that this account goes beyond Kierkegaard’s German
predecessors by introducing a concept of diabolic evil and despair. By
contrast, the present paper argues that Kierkegaard takes diabolic evil to be
impossible, although he offers a rich analysis of the demonic that resembles
diabolic agency. Still, Kierkegaard’s analysis rests on ontological assumptions
about the nature of the good that belong to a Platonico-Christian tradition
that is controversial today.
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Introduction: the guise of the good and evil
The guise of the good (sub specie boni) thesis says that that in f-ing inten-
tionally, we take f-ing to be good.1 It represents the classical view, devel-
oped by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant (as well as Anscombe, Anthony Kenny,
Ronald de Sousa, and Sergio Tenenbaum). It was long considered the key-
stone connecting theories of intentional action with theories of value,
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1Tenenbaum (forthcoming). There are alternative definitions, one of which will be discussed in Section 5.
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normativity, and rationality.2 In the last decades, however, it has come
under attack within moral psychology and action theory. David Velleman
and others argue that diabolic evil is indeed possible, seeing despair as an
almost paradigmatic case of diabolic evil (Velleman 2015, ch. 4; cf. Stocker
1979, 744; Setiya 2007, 36–38).
The concept of diabolic evil is somewhat controversial, since it contra-
dicts the guise of the good thesis. Even if diabolic evil is conceptually poss-
ible, there need not exist any empirical cases of it.3 Although there are
several apparent counter-examples to the guise of the good (including
acedia and despair), there hardly seem to exist any clear cases that unequi-
vocally demonstrates the existence of diabolic evil.4
Diabolic evil seems to require that one do evil in an entirely unselfish
and disinterested manner, since selfish actions aim at (perceived) personal
goods. At least, this is what several philosophers have convincingly
argued, independently of each other.5 Diabolic evil requires that in
f-ing intentionally, we only take f-ing to be evil. Still, a choice of (diabolic)
evil for its own sake need not prevent diabolic evil from resulting in per-
sonal benefit as an unintentional byproduct of this choice. It may be poss-
ible to choose evil unselfishly, just as it is possible to be moral unselfishly.
However, such unselfish choices often result in personal benefit as an
unintended byproduct, but this is something that only occurs after
virtue or vice has already been chosen selflessly (Davenport 2007, ch. 10).
Kierkegaard’s celebrated, systematic analysis of despair in The Sickness
unto Death is relevant here since it sheds light not just on despair in
general but also on demonic evil and the guise of the good in particular.6
Michelle Kosch argues that Kierkegaard goes beyond Kantianism and
German Idealism by developing a moral psychology that undermines
the guise of the good thesis: ‘Kierkegaard devoted a large part of his
effort as an author to an extensive typology of moral character, and he
2Tenenbaum (forthcoming) referencing Joseph Raz.
3Velleman and Tenenbaum seem to agree on this. Velleman is making a conceptual claim about agency
rather than an empirical claim about our psychology. See Velleman (2015, 94 n35); Tenenbaum (2007,
230).
4Tenenbaum argues plausibly ‘against the idea that there are any compelling examples of’ diabolic evil.
See Tenenbaum (2018, 13).
5Caswell (2007); Davenport (2007, ch. 10); Muchnik (2009, 116); Svendsen (2010, 87ff.). These approaches
may presuppose a somewhat impartial interpretation of morality. However, Sussman’s (2015) alternative
interpretation of diabolic evil takes it to consist in whims and caprice that breaks with our striving for
good. However, such acts may be neither intentional nor reflexive nor deliberative. As such, they need
not contradict the guise of the good, since this thesis only concerns intentional action. Moreover, it is
difficult to see how whims could be particularly diabolic.
6This analysis influenced not just continental philosophy from Heidegger to Sartre and Habermas but it is
also relevant to contemporary discussions in Anglophone philosophy after MacIntyre and Frankfurt. See
Davenport (2012); Grøn (1997); Rudd (2012); Theunissen (2005).
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did not overlook the various ways, not only of self-consciously abstaining
from pursuing the good, but also of self-consciously pursuing the bad for its
own sake.’7 However, it seems that diabolic evil (and diabolic despair) differ
from demonic evil (or demonic despair) in Kierkegaard. In the literature on
evil, ‘diabolic’ and ‘demonic’ are often used interchanging. In order to
avoid confusion, I reserve the concept ‘demonic’ for Kierkegaard’s use of
it, and ‘diabolic’ for evil that is done merely because it is evil. The questions
then are (1) whether these two concepts are identical or not, and (2) if we
need a concept of diabolic evil in order to account for extreme cases of
despair and evil.
My answers to these questions are both negative. I contend that the
concept of the demonic in Kierkegaard is relevant to contemporary con-
cerns precisely because it makes it possible to account for extreme
despair and evil without accepting diabolic evil. My main objective is to
argue (pace Kosch) that Kierkegaard adheres to the guise of the good
thesis, although demonic despair involves defiance, malice, and rage
that clearly resembles diabolic evil.8 I contend that Kierkegaard’s
account of demonic despair represents a plausible account of substantial
issues in moral psychology and action theory.9 More specifically, Kierke-
gaard accounts for virtually the same phenomenon as Velleman does
(i.e. extreme evil and despair exemplified by Milton’s Satan) without
giving up the guise of the good. The influential account of despair in
The Sickness unto Death represents a thorough, systematic analysis of
despair that is relevant to contemporary debates in moral psychology, par-
ticularly for debates on the guise of the good, despair, demoralisation, and
practical identity.10
In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard describes ethico-religious evil
in terms of despair, and offers a typology of different forms of despair.
One of these forms, the demonic, represents an extreme form of evil
that clearly goes beyond evil in a broad or weak sense. Kierkegaard’s
account of evil is traditional insofar as he relies on a broad notion of
7Kosch (2006a, 280), my italics. See also Kosch (2006b, chs. 5–6). Kosch also references Velleman in this
connection. However, most other Kierkegaard commentators tacitly presuppose the guise of the
good thesis (see below for some references).
8Kierkegaard’s notes on Leibniz from 1842 to 1843 clearly shows familiarity with, but no criticism of, the
guise of the good. In his Theodicy, which Kierkegaard read and took notes from, Leibniz writes that
‘the will is never prompted to action save by the representation of the good’. Leibniz also writes that
‘the will consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the good it contains’ (Theodicy 1
§§22, 45). To will something is therefore to regard it as being good, Leibniz claims. See Løkke and
Waaler (2009, 65).
9I am indebted to a reviewer for comments at this point.
10See Rudd (2012) and Davenport (2012) on Kierkegaardian despair and practical identity.
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moral evil as a type of character flaw, or even as a type of perverted or
corrupted character (similar to radical evil and original sin). On this
account, any character that falls short of moral perfection implies a
weak type of evil or immortality. Evil in this weak sense is a presupposi-
tion for demonic evil but not the other way around. The problem with
focusing on this weak notion of evil is that we can easily overlook the
extreme, narrow notion of evil that picks out the most morally despicable
cases. An example of this would be Kant, who is often accused of having
a notion of evil that fails to pick out despicable cases of evil. The problem
with focusing on the narrow notion of evil, on the other hand, is that evil
then seems too extreme and too rare to concern us seriously. It is all too
easy to distance oneself from extreme evil and to see it as irrelevant for
the understanding of oneself and one’s potential. It seems then that we
need both notions of evil and that we should try to understand how they
relate to each other. However, it should be noted that Kierkegaard seems
to identify despair with evil and with sin.11 Demonic despair represents
an extreme form of evil and sinfulness that goes far beyond ordinary
forms of evil and despair.
The next part of this article (Section 2) introduces the contemporary
debate on the guise of the good thesis by focusing on the different
interpretations of Milton’s Satan in Anscombe and Velleman. Section 3
presents Velleman’s account of diabolic evil and despair. It emphasises
how the experience of loss is central both to Velleman’s account of evil
as well as to the competing accounts of Kierkegaard and Tenenbaum. In
this connection, the relation between despair and acedia is discussed
briefly, since despair and acedia are both central to discussions of the
guise of the good (and both are relevant for understanding the experience
of loss that is central to diabolic and demonic evil). I suggest that Tenen-
baum’s account of acedia partially overlaps with demonic despair in Kier-
kegaard, although competing accounts of acedia differ strongly from
demonic despair. In Section 4, I present Kierkegaard’s account of
demonic despair as a plausible alternative to Velleman’s account of dia-
bolic despair. Section 5 gives three arguments why Kierkegaard adheres
to the guise of the good, while Section 6 concludes that demonic
despair supports the guise of the good.
11The identification of sin and despair is explicit in Part II of The Sickness unto Death, which has the title
‘Despair is Sin’. However, the identification with evil is mostly implicit. For Kierkegaard’s account of evil,
see Kosch (2006b, chs. 5–6) and Fremstedal (2014, ch. 2).
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Milton’s Satan – Anscombe vs. Velleman
In Paradise Lost, Milton’s Satan famously says ‘Evil be thou my Good’
(Milton 2005, Book IV; line 110). To Satan, objective evil appears subjec-
tively good and desirable, as something that should be pursued for its
own sake. However, there is disagreement over whether Satan acts sub
specie boni or not. In a much-quoted passage, Elizabeth Anscombe
offers the following interpretation:
[O]ne can go on to say ‘And what’s the good of its being bad?’ to which the
answer might be condemnation of good as impotent, slavish, and inglorious.
Then the good of making evil my good is my intact liberty in the unsubmissive-
ness of my will.12
This is a possible explanation of Satan’s attraction to evil, in which Satan
acts under the guise of the good. On Anscombe’s reading,
1. Satan values glory and the liberty of his unsubmissive will;
2. he finds the (objective or divine) good ‘impotent, slavish and
inglorious’;
3. he condemns the (objective or divine) good, since it is incompatible
with his (subjective) values.
Satan values his individual power of choice and sees it as incompatible
with what is objectively or divinely good. He therefore rebels against
goodness and insists on his intact freedom to do so. Thus, he is defiant,
just like Kierkegaard’s demonic agent. Indeed, Satan and the demonic
seem to represent the very same phenomenon.13
In an influential passage, David Velleman objects to Anscombe’s
interpretation:
[Satan] cannot reasonably be interpreted as adopting new estimates of what’s
valuable – that is, as resolving to cease judge evil to be evil in what he now
desires, if he ever comes to think of what he desires as really good, he will no
longer be at all satanic; he’ll be just another well-intended fool. The ruler of
12Anscombe (1963, 75)’s interpretation here is in line with Miltonists such as Tanner (1992, 123–139).
Tanner (1992, 123) writes: ‘[F]or Milton’s human sinners, evil always remain evil – that which they
loathe; for Milton’s demonic sinners [and Satan], evil becomes defined as good – that which they
love, or at least attempt to love.’
13Tanner (1992, 130, 146) writes: ‘For the Miltonist, Kierkegaard’s description of the demonic could hardly
fit Paradise Lostmore neatly [… .] despite all that has been written about Milton’s Satan, significant new
insight into his malaise are available from Kierkegaard, whose analysis of ‘demonic despair’ in The Sick-
ness unto Death […] often seems as if it were penned specifically with the existential position of Milton’s
Satan in mind.’
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Hell doesn’t desire what he wrongly thinks is worthy of approval; he desires what
he rightly thinks isn’t. (Velleman 2015, 95)
According to Velleman, Satan desires evil because it is evil, not because it
appears good. However, there are several problems here. First, referring to
Satan is not very helpful, since we neither have a very clear account of him
nor of diabolic evil nor of their relevance for human agency.14 It is not per-
fectly clear whether Satan does evil (only because it is evil) in an entirely
disinterested manner or whether he merely has a perverted notion of
good and self-interest.15 Velleman seems to think that Satan needs to
be wholly perverted and therefore clear-minded – not mistaken – about
what he is doing (Tenenbaum 2007, 252). Sergio Tenenbaum comments:
[I]t is not clear that Satan pursues what is bad simpliciter, rather tha[n] what is
morally bad or some other specific form of badness. After all, Satan does not
seem to find anything attractive in foul tasting food, badly played music, or
being engaged in boring activities, even though all these things are also bad.
If a perverse agent is attracted by badness as such, why wouldn’t she be attracted
(at least to some extent) to all instances of badness?16
Second, it is perfectly possible to recognise something as evil in one
respect and good in another. Kant’s ‘radical evil,’ for instance, can
appear attractive, not by virtue of being morally evil, but by virtue of
serving self-interest (or sensuousness). The guise of the good does not
rule out intentional evil if evil is seen as being good in some respect; it
is compatible with a weak form of perversion, in which evil is only ‘an
essential component of what attracts’ (Tenenbaum 2018, 13). Satan can
indeed rebel against divine goodness if there are other values or goods
he prefers instead. More specifically, he values glory and liberty instead
of God’s slavish values. Satan shows his ‘“intact liberty” only by pursuing
some form of badness’ that deviates from the good commanded by
God (Tenenbaum 2018, 12; cf. 2007, 253f.).
The guise of the good thesis has the advantage of making evil partially
intelligible. It makes it possible to see that moral evil is motivated by some
non-moral value-commitment (e.g. self-interest). Insofar as we can find
these non-moral values attractive or appealing, we may have sympathy
for the devil, since ‘we can see, or be caught in the illusion, that Satan’s
ends are desirable.’ (Tenenbaum 2007, 256) Still, we may ask (as Velleman
14Tenenbaum (2007, 256) says that our intuitions about Satan are not to be relied on as an oracle.
However, it seems plausible that Satan is morally perverse and that his cognition is somewhat limited.
15Tanner (1992) argues at length that Milton’s Satan acts sub specie boni.
16Tenenbaum (forthcoming, 14). I have corrected one typo and the pagination may differ from the final
printed version, which is still not available.
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does) whether Satan, or someone else, is just another well-intended fool. If
evil mainly involves a theoretic error, or a cognitive mistake, it is indeed
difficult to see how evil can be imputable (or even intelligible). On this
type of (Socratic) approach, evil does indeed seem foolish.
By contrast, a broadly Augustinian account takes evil to involve a prac-
tical or evaluative mistake instead. More specifically, an evil agent chooses
a lesser good (e.g. self-interest) over a higher good (e.g. morality). This eva-
luative mistake results either from akrasia (Tenenbaum 2007, ch. 7), or
from deliberate prioritisation of lesser goods above higher goods. These
evaluative mistakes differ from just being a well-intended fool, although
they are notoriously difficult to account for. Augustine and Kant, for
instance, though the fall into evil was mysterious, something Kierkegaard
alleviates somewhat by introducing a psychological account of anxiety as
that sheds some limited light on the fall.17 However, Augustin, Kant, and
Kierkegaard all take such evaluative mistakes to involve a form of self-
deception that confuses a lesser value with a higher value. Still, this self-
deception is assumed to result from corrupted volition rather than
merely a cognitive mistake.18 As we will see in the next section, Velleman
sketches an alternative account of evil in which the agent pursues evil for
its own sake in a clear-minded manner.
Loss, despair and acedia – Velleman, Tenenbaum, and
Kierkegaard
In a somewhat Kierkegaardian spirit, Velleman writes:
Suppose that I have suffered a profound disappointment that has cast me into a
mood of bitterness and despair. In this mood, the very thought of ameliorating
my condition, or the conditions of the world, strikes me as a sick delusion. All
attempts at constructive action seems absurd. No more earnest efforts for me,
I say to myself, no more worthy endeavors: to hell with it all. (Velleman 2015, 98)
It is difficult to see how one could become disappointed unless one
became disappointed over loosing something good or valuable. There-
fore, Velleman’s agent does not seem diabolic initially; something that
suggests that diabolic agency is not a default position. This suspicion is
confirmed by Velleman’s later comment (on the very same page) that
17By relying on a descriptive, phenomenological account, The Concept of Anxiety argues that the fall into
evil is preceded by the experience of anxiety, an experience closely linked with moral freedom itself. Cf.
Quinn (1990), Kosch (2006b, 210) and Grøn (2008).
18Cf. Fremstedal (2014, ch. 2). See also Section 5.
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the diabolic agent is ‘determined never to do a good or desirable or posi-
tive thing again.’ (Velleman 2015, 98) Despair is preceded by a loss of a per-
ceived good (something Kierkegaard also claims),19 which somehow
contributes to a transition from acting under the guise of the good to
acting diabolically. For Velleman, this loss of good leads to total hopeless-
ness, which sees goodness as generally impossible. As we will see, Kierke-
gaard has a very similar but more elaborate analysis that differs from
Velleman by accepting the guise of the good. Whereas Velleman thinks
profound loss or disappointment precedes diabolic despair, Kierkegaard
thinks that it precedes demonic despair.
The profound disappointment, or loss of value, is crucial not only to Vel-
leman’s account of despair but also to the account of acedia in Tenen-
baum (and Kierkegaard).20 Acedia is relevant not only for understanding
the experience of loss but also for the guise of the good. Like despair,
acedia has been central to discussions of the guise of the good, since it
is often taken to represent a prima facie counter-example to the guise
of the good. In a classical paper, Michael Stocker stresses that acedia
seems to undermine the guise of the good, since it involves seeing ‘all
the good to be won’ yet lacking ‘the will, interest, desire or strength‘ to
do anything about it.21 Acedia therefore involves the lack of motivation
to act, although one’s evaluation of value is intact. Instead of pursuing
good or evil, one lacks motivation and does not care.
In a book that responds to Stocker and Velleman, Tenenbaum objects
that it possible to account for acedia without accepting diabolic evil. He
writes:
[T]he agent in a state of accidie takes certain evaluative perspectives to be con-
ditioned by certain states of affairs that do not obtain. In extreme cases, all eva-
luative perspectives are taken by the person suffering from accidie to be
conditioned and to be such that the particular condition does not obtain.
(Tenenbaum 2007, 293)
On this (competing) account, acedia involves appreciating certain values
(e.g. personal freedom), while seeing them as impossible to realise, since
they are conditioned by states of affairs that do not obtain. For instance,
an Aristotelian may think that full happiness is impossible to realise,
since the necessary external goods are lacking and moral virtue is
19Grøn (1997, 153) strongly emphasises this experience of loss in his influential phenomenological recon-
struction of Kierkegaard’s concept of despair.
20Cf. Tenenbaum (2007, ch. 8). For Kierkegaard, see below.
21Stocker (1979, 744) also mentions despair in this context, as does Setiya (2007, 36–38).
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undermined by bad luck.22 This fits perfect with the idea, from Kierkegaard
and Velleman (Tenenbaum discusses the latter), that serious disappoint-
ments or loss can lead either to acedia or to despair. Acedia then involves
the experience of being stuck or trapped in an absurd situation that does
not allow for the realisation of value. The world seems inhospitable, since it
does not allow the realisation of values or goods.
Clearly, acedia is incompatible with substantial knowledge, belief, or
hope that values can be realised. The agent suffering from acedia there-
fore finds it regrettable that ‘the condition [of value] does not obtain:
that she is the kind of person she is, that things came down this way,
and so on.’ (Tenenbaum 2007, 295) But how do acedia and despair
relate to each other? Both Kierkegaard and his commentators seem to
identify acedia with a particular form of despair (Theunissen 1996, 44ff.;
Cappelørn 2008; McDonald 2009, 76, 81n86), something neither Tenen-
baum nor Velleman seems to do. However, there are different interpret-
ations of acedia. On the interpretation of Tenenbaum, acedia seems to
represent a particular form of Kierkegaard’s authentic or conscious
despair. More specifically, extreme cases of acedia, in which all values
are seen as unrealisable, overlaps with total, conscious despair that has
values but see these as unrealisable (i.e. defiance). As such, acedia partially
overlaps with Kierkegaard’s demonic despair, although the latter goes
beyond acedia by introducing several extra conditions, as we will see
below (in Section 4).
Still, this interpretation of acedia is controversial. It is also possible to
view acedia as a lack of care that prevents the pursuit of good and evil,
although it may still involve some belief in good. This second interpret-
ation takes acedia to lack ‘will, interest, desire or strength’ to pursue
good or evil (Stocker 1979, 744). As such, it does not represent Kierke-
gaardian defiance but instead the despair of weakness. This is a form
of conscious despair that is diametrically opposed to demonic despair,
since it is dominated by passivity instead of activity. The despair of weak-
ness does not want to be itself, whereas demonic despair represents an
extreme form of defiance that desperately wants to be itself at any
price.23
22See Annas (1993, 376ff.) regarding constitutive moral luck in Aristotle.
23For the despair of weakness, see SKS 11, 164ff. / SUD, 49ff. For demonic despair, see SKS 11, 181–187,
esp. 184–187 / SUD, 67–74, esp. 71–74. I attribute the writings of Anti-Climacus to Kierkegaard, since
Kierkegaard endorses Anti-Climacus’ views and ideals, although he does not claim to live up to them.
Cf. SKS 22, 130, NB 11:209 / KJN 2007, 6, 127ff.; Theunissen 2005, 122n. Still, not much hangs on this here.
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Demonic despair in The Sickness unto Death
In The Sickness unto Death, demonic despair is first based on the attempt to
create oneself, something that contradicts facticity.24 This attempt to exag-
gerate individual freedom and possibilities understates actual limitations
and depreciates the real possibilities of the situation. Freedom and possi-
bilities becomes abstract, negative and fantastic, since they are discon-
nected from the given situation. As a result, the demonic is not
positively free to do anything specific nor able to choose non-arbitrarily
between different possibilities.25 Still, self-creation is considered good
and hindrances evil.
Second, the demonic is consciously aware that he despairs over the
realisation of freedom, since the condition for its realisation does not
obtain, something that involves profound disappointment and loss (SKS
1997–2013, 11, 182ff. / SUD 1983, 69f.) or acedia, as defined by Tenenbaum
(2007). However, this experience of loss and disappointment can be both
general and specific. One can despair over passivity (passion or suffering)
and the lack of freedom in general, and one can despair over particular
events or problems that undermine one’s values and identity. Even
though there are general problems that underlie this form of despair,
the person in despair may focus on particular problems that seem to
destroy life in general. Thus, the latter is taken not as isolated episodes
but as something that leads to despair over life as a whole.
Third, the demonic tries but fails to ignore suffering and despair (#2). As
a result, he actively gives up all hope, courage, and faith that suffering and
despair can be overcome. He thinks that it is too late for him to overcome
suffering and despair. He therefore (a) defiantly rejects all help to overcome
suffering and despair and (b) takes pride in suffering, despair, and victim-
hood, by identifying with it (i.e. by letting higher-order motives reinforce
and sustain despair, suffering, and victimhood). He focuses all his attention
on despair and is highly conscious of it (SKS 11, 184f. / SUD, 71f.; cf. SKS 4,
446 / CA 1980, 146).
Finally, he does not share his problems with others but keeps them to
himself. Demonic despair therefore involves Indesluttethed (SKS 11, 186 /
24SKS 11, 182f. / SUD, 67-69. The concept of facticity involves always already being situated in a specific
situation. Human agents are always already particular embodied human beings, with specific histories,
who are born into, and more or less entangled in, particular traditions and particular communities. Fac-
ticity then refers to the very limits – and possibility – of human freedom, as represented by embodiment
and an inescapable socio-historical context. Cf. Rudd (2012, Part 1); Davenport (2012); Fremstedal (2014,
ch. 3).
25This appears to involve a sophisticated wantonness, which views all lower-order motives as equally valid
and invalid. Cf. Rudd (2012, 80ff.) and Davenport (2012, 123).
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SUD, 73), a Danish word that is translated as Verschlossenheit, uncommu-
nicativeness, self-enclosure, inclosing reserve and reticence.
The first point coincides with Milton’s Satan who tries to define his own
values by arbitrary fiat and to be self-sufficient (cf. Tanner 1992, 133). (It
also overlaps with Romantic irony and extreme forms of existential auth-
enticity that involve self-creation.26) The second point is confluent with
the profound disappointment that Velleman thinks precedes despair
and the loss that Tenenbaum thinks constitutes extreme acedia. The
third point involves a complete loss of general hope in the future that
seems implicit in the analyses of Velleman and Tenenbaum (although it
is neither clear that acedia implies (a) defiant rejection of all help nor (b)
that one takes pride in suffering, suffering, despair, and victimhood). The
two last points (##3–4) also come close to Velleman’s vivid description
of despair:
In this mood, the very thought of ameliorating my condition, or the conditions of
the world, strikes me as a sick delusion. All attempts at constructive action seems
absurd. No more earnest efforts for me, I say to myself, no more worthy endea-
vors: to hell with it all. (Velleman 2015, 98)
However, despair is not just (#2) a psychological phenomenon for Kierke-
gaard, or something we experience or suffer (such as a state or feeling of
hopelessness). It also involves (#3) an act whereby we actively despair by
giving up hope and courage. Despair both involves suffering a loss, or to
despair over something that happens, and to attribute infinite weight to
the loss, or event, onedespairs over by seeing it asdestroying life in general.27
At first glance, it may seem that Kosch is right in claiming that demonic
despair involves pursing evil for its own sake. Both the concept ‘demonic’
and Kierkegaard’s description may suggest this, although I think it is some-
what misleading. In any case, Kierkegaard’s description certainly does not
imply that the demonic has committed any diabolic deed (and neither
does Velleman’s desperate agent who hides behind the curtains). It is
simply not clear that the four points above involve diabolic evil, unless the
two last points (##3-4) somehow lead to a fifth point that involves doing
evil merely because it is evil. Kierkegaard himself seems to deny this:
‘[D]espite all his defiance, [a person] does not have the power to tear
26See McDonald (2009, 71) who focuses on demonic boredom, but also connects it to melancholia, irony,
and anxiety.
27See Grøn (1997, 153) on the interplay between passivity and activity in despair. Kierkegaard supports his
analysis with a descriptive and analytic exposition of different forms of consciousness reminiscent of
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Different forms of consciousness are criticised on their own terms by
identifying a conflict between the self-understanding at work and what it shows and achieves (Grøn
1997, 33f., 133, 138f.).
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himself away completely from the good, because it is the stronger, he also
does not even have the power to will it completely.’ (SKS 8, 146 / UD 2009,
33) It therefore seems that Kierkegaard accepts the guise of the good,
while accounting for virtually the same phenomenon as Velleman does.
Three arguments against the diabolic reading of Kierkegaard
In this section, I will argue that the psychological, theological, and ethical
views of Kierkegaard presuppose the guise of the good thesis. More
specifically, he is committed to a psychological eudaimonism, a soteriolo-
gical universalism, and a constitutivism about goodness that all presup-
pose the guise of the good.
Psychological eudaimonism presupposes the guise of the good, by
assuming that we always act with the good of happiness in mind.28
Human beings generally desire to be happy or to live well, although
they interpret happiness differently. The different characters and pseudo-
nyms found in Kierkegaard’s authorship all seem concerned with the
pursuit of happiness and goodness in some form or another.29 Aesthetes,
for instance, typically pursue happiness in the form of pleasure or by prior-
itising the strongest given desires. The ethicist (JudgeWilliam), by contrast,
emphasises moral constraints on happiness and self-interest. Still, he
repudiates diabolic evil, although he confuses it with Kant’s ‘radical
evil’.30 Instead of allowing diabolic evil, Kierkegaard generally contrasts
morality with self-interest (or sensuousness). The implication is that the
fundamental moral choice is between moral and prudential goods. Evil
agents prioritise self-interest (sensuousness) above morality, whereas
moral agents have exactly opposite priorities (Fremstedal 2014, ch. 2). In
both cases, agents act sub specie boni by pursuing good.
Moreover, Kierkegaard’s egalitarian soteriology rests on the assumption
that divine salvation is universally available (although it is possible to resist
divine grace).31 However, it is assumed that salvation would not even be
28Kierkegaard’s relation to the eudaimonistic tradition is complex. He sketches a critique of ethical eudai-
monism, but seems to accept psychological eudaimonism. In this context, ethical eudaimonism is the
view that morality is justified prudentially, because moral virtue leads to personal happiness. See Frem-
stedal (forthcoming); cf. Webb (2017) and Mendham (2007). See also SKS 7, 313, 367, 387 / CUP1 1992,
342f., 403, 426. For psychological eudaimonism, see Hare (2002, 75, 87). For a somewhat different
account, see Davenport (2007, ch. 6).
29For Kierkegaard’s view of happiness, see Olivares-Bøgeskov (2014).
30SKS 3, 170f., 173 / EO2 1990, 174f., 178. For the ethicist’s view of happiness, see SKS 3, 119, 205, 207 /
EO2, 118f., 213, 216.
31For Kierkegaard’s universalist soteriology, see Jackson (1998, 238). Even alternative (semi-pelagian) read-
ings of Kierkegaard’s soteriology seem to accept the guise of the good.
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possible unless there is some (objective) good left in the person who is
saved, as The Concept of Anxiety makes clear (SKS 4, 424 / CA, 122).
From this, it follows that no human being is entirely evil or totally
depraved. The Sickness unto Death even makes it clear that the demonic
is close to Christian salvation, indicating that he is not entirely evil (at
least not objectively so – cf. SKS 11, 185f. / SUD, 71f.).
In order to understand Kierkegaard’s notion of evil, I suggest dis-
tinguishing between subjective and objective versions of the sub specie
boni thesis. The subjective version of the thesis says that in f-ing intention-
ally, we take f-ing to be good.32 Alternatively, it says that to desire or
pursue something involves taking it to be good. The good is here
merely a perceived (subjective) good. By contrast, the objective (constituti-
vist) version of the thesis says that human agency presupposes the objec-
tive good, even if the agent fail to realise it. In Kierkegaard, the idea seems
to be that human selfhood and practical identity presuppose the objective
good.33 The latter implies that any attempt to escape the good is futile,
since evil is parasitic on (objective) good. Put differently, ethico-religious
goodness, represented by the unconditional ethical task andmoral norma-
tivity, is constitutive of our selfhood and practical identity. Whereas Kan-
tians see categorical and hypothetical imperatives as constitutive of
intentional action and practical identity,34 Kierkegaard sees ethico-reli-
gious goodness (and its obligations) as constitutive of selfhood and prac-
tical identity. Goodness does not represent a defeatable constitutive aim
but rather an inescapable constitutive principle. This strong, objectivist
and constitutivist view is developed in ‘Purity of Heart,’ Part I of Upbuilding
Discourses in Various Spirits from 1847.35
According to ‘Purity of Heart,’we are only free to choose between being
unconditionally good and being good to some extent, or in some respect,
only (cf. SKS 8, 139f. / UD, 24f.; Knappe 2004, chs. 3–4). Since it is inescap-
able, it is only the good, in an ethico-religious sense, that may be willed
unconditionally and consistently without any contradiction or inconsis-
tency. Kierkegaard therefore writes: ‘[T]he person who in truth wills only
32As defined by Tenenbaum (forthcoming).
33I agree with Rudd (2012) and Davenport (2012) that Kierkegaardian selfhood involves practical identity
that takes a narrative form. Still, it is not clear that selfhood is reducible to a narrative identity. See Stokes
(2015, esp. chs. 7–9).
34See Korsgaard (2013). Constitutivism about practical normativity tries to derive practical normativity
from agency itself. Such constitutivism is found both in Kantianism and German Idealism. See the
interpretation of independence in Kosch (2018, esp. 36).
35Kosch appears to overlook this text, although scholars typically see it as directly relevant for understand-
ing despair, volition and selfhood. Cf. Grøn (1997); Rudd (2012); Davenport (2012).
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one thing can will only the good [… .] the good is unconditionally the one
and only thing that a person may will and shall will’.36
Willing something else than the good, by contrast, involves double-
mindedness. Kierkegaard writes:
The person who wills one thing that is not the good is actually not willing one
thing; it is an illusion, a semblance, a deception, a self-deception that he wills
only one thing – because in his innermost being he is, he must be, double-
minded. This is why the apostle says, ‘Purify your hearts, you double-minded’
(SKS 8, 139f. / UD, 25)
Kierkegaard generally interprets despair as double-mindedness.37 He
writes that ‘[e]veryone in despair has two wills, one that he futilely
wants to follow entirely, and one that he futilely wants to get rid of
entirely’.38 Getting rid of the good is futile and self-defeating, since it is
inescapable (SKS 8, 123 / UD, 7). Immorality therefore involves double-
mindedness that is split between the (moral) good it (futilely) wants to
avoid and the non-moral good that it prefers instead. Purity of heart, by
contrast, requires unconditional moral dedication. However, human
agents need not be aware of this. As a result, evil involves both a tendency
to overlook the inescapability of the good and an evaluative mistake that
depreciates ethico-religious goodness and over-appreciates non-moral
value.
The upshot is that the relation between good and evil is fundamentally
asymmetric, since evil depends on good but not vice versa. Kierkegaard
therefore concludes that, ‘despite all his defiance, [a person] does not
have the power to tear himself away completely from the good,
because it is the stronger, he also does not even have the power to will
it completely.’ (SKS 8, 146 / UD, 33) It is then impossible ‘that a person
could harden himself to willing only evil’ (SKS 8, 147f. / UD, 34). Kierke-
gaard even goes to the extreme of saying that ‘all roads lead to the
good, even the road of error’ (SKS 8, 139 / UD, 25). Presumably, evil
leads to good by allowing suffering and guilt-consciousness that in turn
makes possible faith, sin-consciousness, and divine forgiveness. Even
though sin deviates from the good or the eternal, it is still the case that
latter ‘is the dominant, which does not want to have its time but wants
36SKS 8, 138f. / UD, 24f. However, categorical moral dedication does not rule out other concerns and obli-
gations. Rather, the point is only that the latter are a matter of secondary importance if morality is at
stake.
37Rudd (2012) interprets double-mindedness as an incoherent practical identity and purity of heart as a
coherent identity. See also Davenport (2012).
38SKS 8, 144 / UD, 30. Self-creation, for instance, is split between possibilities and actuality, freedom and
necessity. It wants the former only, but always ends up with the latter as well.
14 R. FREMSTEDAL
to make time [itself] its own and then permits the temporal also to have its
time.’39 The good is eternal since it is both unchangeable and the root of
time itself, including the future (particularly the eschatological future). The
temporal, by contrast, represents an ever-changing manifold that does not
allow true unity, unless dominated by the eternal in the form of the
morally good (SKS 8, 140ff. / UD, 26ff.). True unity therefore requires eter-
nity, Kierkegaard argues in a Platonic manner.
Kierkegaard consistently identifies the divine and the good,40 taking
divine goodness and unity to be present in everything, while metaphori-
cally describing sin as a divorce from goodness (SKS 8, 123 / UD, 7). This
appears to involve a relational understanding of evil, as something that
can only be understood as a reaction against good. However, it also
seems to imply that evil itself has a relational nature, since evil only
exists by reacting against good. Kierkegaard therefore seems not only to
make an epistemological claim about how we understand evil but also
an ontological claim about the nature of evil.
Scholars often (and rightly) associate the central claim about the parasitic
nature of evil with Kierkegaard’s Platonico-Christian and Kantian back-
ground.41 This background is difficult to reconcile with Kosch’s reading of
Kierkegaard as a theological voluntarist who dismisses both the guise of
the good and moral realism.42 There even seems to be a creation theology
in ‘Purity of Heart’ that takes divine creation to be very good, although the
fall partially corrupts creation (SKS 8, 123 / UD, 7, cf. SKS 9, 66f., 94, 118,
219ff. / WL 1998, 60, 88f., 115, 216ff.). There is an element of goodness left
in human evil that allows guilt-consciousness, faith, and sin-consciousness
(although the two latter require divine revelation) (Fremstedal 2014, ch. 2).
Still, Kierkegaard is clear that evil is not a mere lack of good, since it involves
an active opposition to the good. Under the subheading ‘That sin is not a
39SKS 8, 127 / UD, 11. Still, to despair is ‘to lose the eternal,’ since ‘the eternal’ represents the present in
which the self should take responsibility for its whole life. Unless it takes full responsibility for itself, the
self cannot fully endorse itself reflectively or accept itself completely. Without full acceptance, or uncon-
ditional willingness to be itself, the self is in despair, since it is split between actuality, which it does not
fully accept or endorse, and ideals, which it does identify with. See Pap. 1968–1978 VIII–2 B154:3 / JP
1967–1978 1, 747. Cf. Stokes (2015, 167).
40For this identification, see SKS 4, 160 / FT 1983, 68; SKS 6, 439 / SLW 1988, 476; SKS 7, 133, 143 / CUP1,
142, 153f.; SKS 8, 364, 151, 153 / UD, 268, 39, 41; Rudd (2012, 45f.); Evans (2006, 88, 105, 183).
41Cf. Knappe (2004, chs. 3–4). Kantians, for instance, argue that lying is parasitic on truth-telling. Still, it is
possible to give a different justification for such an asymmetry between good and evil. For instance,
theories of intersubjective recognition (developed by Fichte, Hegel, Honneth, Velleman, and Skorupski)
offer different justifications. Typically, such theories see dominance and slavery as parasitic on mutual
recognition. For a Hegelian approach, see Williams (1997).
42Kosch even seems to think that voluntarism gives a more satisfactory account of evil (as imputable and
intelligible) than ethical intellectualism and Kantian rationalism, something that is quite controversial.
See Irwin (2011, vol. 3, 107, 308) and Kosch (2006b). For alternative interpretations of Kierkegaard,
see Evans (2006); Fremstedal (2014); Rudd (2012); Irwin (2011, ch. 77).
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negation but a position,’ Kierkegaard therefore stresses that sin is something
positive established through a choice; it is not mere negation nor weakness,
sensuousness, finitude, or ignorance (SKS 11, 209, 212 / SUD, 96, 99f.).
Kierkegaard’s constitutivism about the good and practical normativity is
relatively unexplored and deserves more discussion before judgement is
passed on it. Still, it could prove more controversial than other forms of con-
stitutivism, because it relies on a comprehensive Platonico-Christian frame-
work that many find unacceptable. However, even other forms of
constitutivism seem to support the guise of the good (at least in an objective
form that may be compatible with a subjective form of diabolic evil).43 In the
next, final section of this article,wewill see that the analysis of the demonic in
The Sickness unto Death also seems to support the guise of the good.
Conclusion: against the diabolic reading of Kierkegaard
It seems clear that Kierkegaard accepts the objective version of the guise
of the good thesis, but there can still be doubt as to whether he accepts
the subjective, mainstream version of it. Perhaps it is psychologically
possible for an agent to intend pure evil, even though evil is ontologically
dependent on good and the agent fails to realise this. In any case, Kier-
kegaard generally takes despair to involve self-deception (SKS 11, 209,
212 / SUD, 96, 99f.), and even diabolic evil, as defined (in subjective
terms) above, seems compatible with the objective form of the guise
of the good.
In The Sickness unto Death, the demonic hates existence and takes pride
in being a miserable victim. However, does this mean that he has given up
on good (as suggested by Kosch and Velleman)? Is he only intending to do
evil? He has given up self-creation, although he still finds some value and
meaning in protesting and in being a victim beyond hope, since this is the
only way to maintain some independency. He (#2) initially saw suffering
and despair as something bad, but he later came to (#3b) insist on them
by valuing them and identifying with them. This is a desperate, last
attempt to avoid surrendering by accepting help from others.
Demonic despair appears to invert the proper relation between good
and evil in one central case. More specifically, external help represents
objective good, and the demonic objective evil. Yet, external help
appears evil to the demonic, whereas absolutised independence appears
43For Humean constitutivism, see Leffler (2016, 559ff.) and Katsafanas (2018, 373). For Kantian constituti-
vism, see Korsgaard (2013). For Fichtean constitutivism, see Kosch (2018). For Nietzschean constitutivism,
see Katsafanas (2015).
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good. Much like Milton’s Satan, on Anscombe’s interpretation of him, the
demonic values his ‘intact liberty in the unsubmissiveness of [his] will.’44
The demonic then rebels not against all goodness but against a much
more specific form of it, represented by external help either from a
human Other or the divine Other (particularly the latter seems absurd to
the demonic – cf. SKS 11, 185f. / SUD, 71f.). He is not attracted to
badness as such but only to one of its forms. Kierkegaard portrays the
demonic as being too proud to accept help and as rebelling against
(objective and divine) goodness. This clearly suggest original sin in a
broadly Augustinian sense.45 Whereas the diabolic agent does evil in a
selfless manner, the demonic agent is too concerned with himself to act
selflessly. The demonic defiantly wants to be himself as a victim beyond
hope. He sees himself as the big typo in God’s creation that shows just
how bad an author God is (SKS 11, 186f. / SUD, 73f.). The demonic feels
offended by existence as a whole, hates it and rebels against it. This rebel-
lion involves demonic rage and malice, but not disinterestedness or
unselfishness (as required by diabolic evil). Rather than being diabolic,
demonic despair involves wounded pride and perverted self-interest.
The demonic takes pride in being the big typo that has a right to rebel
against God. He wants to be himself at any price, even though it involves
identifying with suffering and victimhood. Still, he values his own freedom
and identity so much that it leads to the rebellion against God. Kierkegaard
famously describes demonic despair as follows:
Demonic despair is the most intense form of the despair: in despair to will to be
oneself. [… .] in hatred towards existence, it wills to be itself […] in accordance
with its misery. […] it will[s] to be itself […] for spite […] [Demonic despair]
wants to force itself upon [the power that established it, i.e. God], to obtrude
defiantly upon it, wants to adhere to it out of malice [… .] Rebelling against
all existence, it feels that it has obtained evidence against it, against its good-
ness. The person in despair believes that he himself is the evidence, and that
is what he wants to be, and therefore he wants to be himself, himself in his
torment, in order to protest against all existence with his torment. [… .] [A] con-
solidation would be his undoing […] it is as if an error slipped into an author’s
writing and the error became conscious of itself as an error […] and now this
error wants to mutiny against the author, out of hatred to him, forbidding
him to correct it and in manical defiance saying to him: No, I refuse to be
erased; I will stand as a witness against you, a witness that you are a second-
rate author. (SKS 11, 186f. / SUD, 73f.)
44Anscombe (1963, 75)’s interpretation of Milton is implicitly supported by Tanner (1992), who explicitly
attributes this view to Kierkegaard.
45See Part Two of The Sickness unto Death, for the identification of sin and despair.
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If correct, this means that Kierkegaard accepts the guise of the good both
objectively and subjectively (although the former is clearer than the latter).
More interestingly, it indicates that the guise of the good makes it possible
to account not only for acedia but also for extreme forms of despair and
evil. Kierkegaard thus seems to account for much the same phenomena
that motivate Velleman and Stocker to give up the guise of the good.46
Still, this does not show that diabolic evil is impossible outside of a Kierke-
gaardian framework. However, it does indicate that diabolic evil is difficult
to reconcile with psychological eudaimonism, constitutivism about practi-
cal normativity, and certain theological views (notably creation theology
and Arminian soteriology).47
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